INTRODUCTION

Among many significant developments in the field of international intellectual property (IP) law, six currently under way stand out as especially noteworthy. Five of these are ongoing treaty negotiations, and the sixth is the longstanding effort in the U.S. Congress to reform the 1952 Patent Act, which has consequential international implications. This white paper summarizes developments to date on all six fronts and discusses some of the implications of the negotiations. The focus here is primarily on those developments of interest to the United States.

The secrecy in which international trade treaty negotiations are often conducted applies equally to intellectual property treaty negotiations. The lack of transparency sometimes impedes civil society, which includes the authors of this white paper, from predicting and influencing international IP treaty negotiations. Prior to the issuance of this white paper, there was very little public information available on some of these treaties, but with the help of newly public information as well as sources in the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO), U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and European Commission, the authors have been able to gain some insight into the status and prospects of the negotiations. This white paper will discuss the proposals in no particular order.

**PATENT COOPERATION TREATY REFORM**

In May 2009, the WIPO presented to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) Working Group a document entitled “The Future of the PCT,” which outlined various perceived problems in the PCT. A few weeks later, the United States presented a proposal to reform the PCT by creating a new treaty (PCT II). Amendment of the existing PCT was not proposed. In this case, the U.S. PTO rather than the USTR is taking the lead on the negotiations. The forum is the WIPO Committee on Reform of the PCT rather than the Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations.

The WIPO document (PCT/WG/2/3, Apr. 3, 2009) identifies several main problems with the operation of the PCT system at present. The first problem is backlogs in processing PCT applications among the national patent offices. WIPO identified needless duplication of patent searches, both within national offices and between offices, as a root cause of these backlogs. A related problem is that the cost of obtaining multinational patent protection through the PCT is prohibitive for individual inventors, developing country inventors, and small and medium-sized business firms even in the developed world. Duplication of work increases the delay inherent in and cost of using the PCT.

Relatively few international patent applications proceed directly to the national stage; most result in parallel proceedings on the national and international stages. Moreover, no major examining office accepts the work of any other national office without performing its own national examination. As a result, an international patent application may be subject to search and examination four or even five times, depending on how it is processed and what level of deference is given to the international search report. Among the solutions suggested by WIPO are the integration by International Searching Authorities (ISAs) of their international search with their own national search (assuming the applicant is seeking a patent from the patent office acting as an ISA, as is usual), so that only a single search is necessary. WIPO recommended examining why patent applicants find inefficient parallel national and international applications beneficial.\(^2\)

WIPO also recommended increasing the quality of the international search reports so that other patent offices would feel more comfortable relying on them instead of conducting their own independent searches during the national stage. The duplication is partly fostered by many patent offices having adopted reservations or notices of incompatibility to the PCT (at present, some 150) that


create discrepancies in international standards for the content and effect of the patent application. The WIPO recommended examining these reservations and notices with a view to their reduction and ultimate withdrawal.

In addition, many states with a registration system do not examine patent validity. A negative international preliminary examination report (IPER) can leave such countries in the position of granting a patent that is probably invalid. WIPO proposed no specific solution to this problem. A related problem is that PCT users have criticized the national patent offices for granting too many invalid patents due to inadequate examination procedures and the absence of an efficient mechanism for invalidating such patents. Increasing the reliability of the international search could help foster reliance on negative reports and reduce the incidence of inaccurate positive reports.

The WIPO took the position that these problems do not require significant amendment of the PCT legal framework, but rather reformation of the practices of the national patent offices, as discussed above. WIPO reported that the “general consensus” in the PCT Working Group favored these suggestions “in principle,” although more detailed proposals would be needed.

Three weeks after the presentation of the WIPO report, the United States proposed its own “Comprehensive Proposal for PCT Reform” (WIPO Doc. PCT/WG/2/12, Apr. 24, 2009). The U.S. proposed a new PCT (“PCT II”) in response to its position that the PCT framework “hampered” the cooperation of national patent offices and thereby failed in its task of eliminating redundant work by the offices. The PCT II would have two key features:

1. combined national and international search and examination accomplished through collaboration among the national patent offices; and
2. allowing the applicant as well as third parties to submit prior art to the international searching authority to improve the quality of the search.

The U.S. PTO argued that the resulting significant improvement in quality of the international search report would eliminate redundancy and greatly increase the confidence of national patent offices in the international search or IPER. It would also save money for the national and regional patent offices by removing the need to conduct an independent, duplicative national examination.

Of course, the cost savings to national patent offices would only be realized if they were to rely on a search and examination by the international searching authorities, which are mostly the more developed patent offices such as the U.S. PTO, the European Patent Office, and the Japan Patent Office. Developing countries generally distrust WIPO efforts to harmonize patent application processing and substantive patent law. Both developing countries and most Group B countries strongly opposed the U.S. proposal as tampering with the basic structure of the PCT. The main concern appeared to be that

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3“Group B” is the term used at WIPO to denote the principal IP-exporting countries, such as the European Union and its most economically developed member states, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States.
the U.S. proposal would have removed some of the flexibility in implementing the multinational patent applications in favor of more control by the receiving offices and international searching authorities.

Soon after the proposal, the Obama Administration assumed office, and with it came a change in the PTO’s attitude toward the PCT. The U.S. PTO is no longer actively pushing for PCT II and appears to be distancing itself from the Bush Administration’s proposal. Nonetheless, there appears to be a consensus among members of the PCT Working Group that the PCT does not function optimally. The Group has endorsed the idea that future study and proposals are needed, but no work is proceeding at this time. Our WIPO source is skeptical of the prospects for over 140 countries agreeing on significant changes to the structure of the PCT, especially in light of a perception that many countries do not trust the intentions of others. In the meantime, both the U.S. PTO and the Japan Patent Office have begun cooperating more by allowing a positive PCT International Search Report to accelerate the examination process, whereas previously these offices gave the report no weight. Greater international cooperation could lead to reduction in the inefficiencies of the PCT process without necessitating major treaty reform.

**ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS**

The United States, EU, Switzerland, Japan, and a few others such as Mexico and Morocco, have since 2006 been negotiating an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). The parties are currently in their eighth round of confidential negotiations, which are taking place outside of both WIPO and the WTO Doha Round. The USTR has announced that the negotiations are intended to result in a treaty that requires no change to U.S. law, but that would require other treaty partners to agree to reforms of the kind found in the IP chapters of the bilateral free trade agreements that the United States has negotiated with various trading partners such as Australia, Morocco, and Singapore.

The secrecy of the negotiations has been unusually controversial, fomenting protests by civil society and some EU officials, including resulting in a disapproving resolution by the European Parliament. Several leaks have resulted in various credible versions of the negotiating text, including proposed language by various negotiating parties, finding their way onto the Internet. As the USTR has stated, these texts do come very close to the intellectual property chapters of the various U.S. bilateral free trade agreements. In April 2010, the USTR finally released a draft of the ACTA to the public, the main provisions of which may be summarized as follows:

Chapter 2, Section 1 of the ACTA would require effective judicial or administrative civil remedies for IP infringement, including the possibility of a cease and desist order against the infringer or an injunction to prevent future infringement, or both. The proposed text also includes the possibility of an order preventing infringing goods from entering national channels of commerce or even being exported (something the TRIPs Agreement does not include, as a WTO panel recently ruled). Pirated or counterfeit goods would be “removed from the national channels of commerce,” meaning that they would be destroyed, turned over to the IP owner, or otherwise disposed of outside of the market. Measures of damages currently under consideration include the IP owner’s lost profits, disgorgement of the infringer’s profits, or statutory damages. It is also proposed to allow the IP owner to choose
between these measures of damages. Judicial or administrative authorities would have the right to subpoena information from accused infringers and to order temporary seizures and other provisional measures inaudita altera parte. Finally, the draft currently includes the possibility of an award of costs and attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, regardless of whether it is the IP owner or accused infringer.

Section 2 deals with border measures, and is in general consistent with U.S. border measures under Section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act. It creates a private right to seek suspension of the release of counterfeit or merely confusingly similar trademarked merchandise; pirated copyright-protected goods; or goods bearing a misleading geographical indication during importation, exportation (again, a new prospect), or transshipment, upon a prima facie showing of infringement. The suspension must last at least one year from the date of application. The IP owner may be required to provide security in the form of a bond in case the detained goods are found to be noninfringing. Section 2 further provides that state parties either may or must (according to different proposals) allow ex officio suspension of release on the initiative of customs authorities. Goods found to be infringing must be destroyed “except in exceptional circumstances” and must not be allowed to enter the channels of commerce or be exported. This provision is undoubtedly intended to strengthen the discretionary remedies provided under the TRIPs Agreement, China’s interpretation of which the United States recently, and mainly unsuccessfully, challenged before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. In addition, the importer, exporter, or other infringer must be “penalized.”

Section 3 requires state parties to adopt criminal penalties for willful trademark infringement (or possibly just counterfeiting, depending on which proposal ultimately succeeds) or copyright piracy taking place “on a commercial scale.” This last term is currently defined to mean not only infringement committed for financial gain, but “significant willful copyright or related rights infringements that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain.” This, too, responds to the DSB panel decision in China – IP Enforcement Measures, which upheld a Chinese law criminalizing only those infringements reaching a certain minimum financial value (20,000 to 50,000 yuan, depending on the type of infringement).

The intentional public transmission or performance of audiovisual works must also be included among the criminal prohibitions. However, the foregoing provisions should be taken as uncertain at the moment; the Section 3 proposals appear to be highly controversial in light of the number of counterproposals under discussion in the negotiations. Section 3 also stipulates that the law of each state party must provide for imprisonment and monetary fines “sufficiently high to provide a deterrent to future acts of infringement.” Various proposals include requiring the criminalization of inciting or aiding and abetting infringing acts as well as the forfeiture of any “materials and implements” used in criminal infringement as well as forfeiture (possibly to the IP owner) of the goods and any assets derived from criminal infringement. These provisions, too, appear somewhat controversial. Finally, criminal authorities must be empowered to investigate and prosecute criminal infringement ex officio.

4 For background information on Section 337, see AARON XAVIER FELLMETH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 167-78 (2009).
Section 4 deals with “special measures related to technological enforcement means and the Internet.” At present, the draft merely requires that civil and criminal enforcement permit effective action against digital or Internet infringement and include expeditious measures to deter future digital infringement. With respect to the liability of Internet service providers (ISPs, including auction Web sites, social networking Web sites, etc.) for infringements by their users, the current draft recognizes the threat to Internet commerce that third party liability poses, but provides a safe harbor in the case of “automatic technical processes”; actions by users of the service when the provider “does not select the material”; or when the provider merely links or refers users to a Web site containing infringing material, so long as the ISP has no actual knowledge of the infringement and implements a policy to “address” infringement (which apparently does not mean monitoring for infringement). Because the ISP would not benefit from a safe harbor if a copyright owner alleges that material on the ISP’s Web site infringes the copyright, such a provision could increase the risks to ISPs of becoming embroiled in expensive and distracting international IP infringement, although perhaps no more than is currently the case under U.S. law through Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).6

Section 4 also will potentially require parties to implement anti-circumvention measures that allow copyright owners to electronically restrict user rights beyond those permitted by law. Moreover, the draft may require state parties to criminalize technological measures taken by IP users to circumvent electronic restrictions, including the importation of circumvention devices and technologies (such as decryption software). Removal or alteration of electronic digital rights management software or other information must be criminalized as well. In each case, circumvention must be criminalized under the U.S. proposal even if undertaken in pursuit of a legitimate right, although the current draft allows parties to adopt “appropriate limitations or exceptions.” The U.S. proposal clearly is intended to incorporate into ACTA controversial provisions similar to those in Title I of the DMCA.7 However, unlike U.S. copyright law, the ACTA does not provide expressly for a “fair use” exception, nor does it allow the importation of circumvention devices with a “substantial noninfringing use,”8 the respective absences of which have raised legitimate concerns among consumer groups that the treaty may be used to undermine existing consumer rights.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with standards for the administration of IP protections. Chapter 3 provides for international cooperation in IP enforcement, including through information sharing; technical assistance and training; development of tools for measuring the effect of anti-counterfeiting and anti-hacking measures; and joint enforcement operations. Chapter 4 commits the parties to developing domestic IP enforcement expertise, collecting information on domestic and import infringement, and facilitating joint action by domestic enforcement authorities such as customs agencies and criminal enforcement agencies. This may include providing by law for government audits of importer records. Chapter 4 also includes some provisions to promote the transparent administration of each state party’s IP rights enforcement system, such as the mandatory publication of judicial or

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administrative rulings of general applicability and publicizing information about how to seek remedies for IP infringement. Finally, Chapter 4 commits the parties to public awareness campaigns regarding “the detrimental effects of intellectual property infringement.” These obligations are qualified by the Article 1.2 disclaimer that “Nothing in this Agreement creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and enforcement of law in general.”

Chapter 5 would create an “oversight” or “steering” committee comprised of one delegate from each party and possibly a permanent Secretariat. The Committee’s general mission will be to supervise the implementation of the agreement; to coordinate further elaboration of the treaty; and to assist in negotiating the settlement of disputes. A number of very different proposals are on the table regarding how the ACTA Committee will be structured, how often it will meet (annually or biannually), and what its functions will include. However, all negotiating parties appear to agree that committee decisions (like WTO General Council decisions) will be made by consensus of the attending parties only. The Secretariat assists the committee and performs various (mostly unspecified) administrative functions.

Chapter 6, which contains the final provisions, specifies who is eligible for membership. Current proposals on the table include WIPO member states, WTO member states, and UN member states. Some delegations have proposed allowing intergovernmental organizations having competence in the subject matter of the treaty (e.g., WIPO) to become parties to the treaty as well, subject to the consent of the Committee. The treaty will enter into force after the fifth ratification has been deposited. Chapter 6 also provides for amendment to the treaty itself on a motion by a state party brought before the ACTA Committee and subject to unanimous consent. Some NGOs have complained that Chapters 5 and 6 would effectively create an organization that could amend ACTA at will, which would indeed raise procedural and possibly constitutional concerns in many countries, including the United States.

Although the current draft is aimed at providing leverage for international enforcement efforts against persistent IP infringers, the draft does foreshadow some adverse effects on consumer rights even in IP-exporting states. It would be salutory, even at this late stage, for the negotiators to pay more attention to the concerns of consumer advocates, some of which are well founded. However, it does not appear likely that the negotiators intend to expand the forum to accommodate dissenting views; their concern has primarily been with redressing the grievances of copyright and trademark owners. The next round of negotiations will take place in Switzerland in June. The USTR expects to conclude the final negotiations by the end of 2010 and has given no indication of any intent to seek a broader consensus.

**STALLED SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW TREATY NEGOTIATIONS**

In 2002, the United States proposed in the WIPO’s Standing Committee on Patents the adoption of a substantive patent law treaty (SPLT) that would move beyond the harmonization found in the TRIPs
Agreement and the WIPO Patent Law Treaty. At the time, the WIPO issued a document (A/37/6, Aug. 19, 2002) pointing out some advantages of a “global patent,” but expressing skepticism of its prospects in the near term. That skepticism has so far proven justified.

The current consensus among Group B countries is for a “reduced package” of harmonization in four issue areas: the definition of prior art; a harmonized definition of novelty; a harmonized definition of inventive step or nonobviousness; and a grace period after public disclosure of the subject matter in a patent application. In 2006, the working group claimed to have arrived at a tentative agreement on the definitions of prior art (anything in the public domain) and novelty. They also stated that they are “largely in agreement” on the third, except for the matter of “secret prior art.” Secret prior art is technology that is available to the patent examiner but not publicly available to inventors (e.g., because it was disclosed in a prior, unpublished, pending patent application by someone other than the patent applicant at issue). Disclosure of prior art in a senior patent application will probably negative novelty, but the working group has not resolved whether secret prior art can be combined with publicly known prior art to render an invention obvious and, therefore, ineligible for a patent.

Regarding the grace period, this subject has occasioned disagreement as well. Currently, the United States is the only country in the world with a first-to-invent registration system. In exchange for abandoning the first-to-invent system and switching over to the first-to-file system used elsewhere, the United States has tried to negotiate for a one-year grace period to allow senior inventors to delay somewhat before filing a patent application. The grace period has been a troublesome issue in the Group B country negotiations at WIPO for a SPLT. In a move to increase its bargaining leverage, the United States later requested an 18-month grace period. Europe and Japan oppose a grace period of more than a year, the former arguing that in any case a grace period will be less important in some industries than in others and that perhaps the treaty should differentiate.

There is a special working group on development issues. The EU has stated that it favored the integration of development issues into the SPLT, and this is a subject on which developing countries are adamant. Key developing countries wish to tie technology transfer, prohibitions on anticompetitive licensing and exploitation practices, and the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge into any SPLT. The Asian Group took this position early on.

WIPO’s International Bureau produced a draft treaty in 2004 as the basis for negotiations, and the SPLT dominated the Standing Committee on Patent’s agenda in 2006. Nonetheless, very little has been accomplished since 2006. After several failed attempts to move forward with a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, the deputy director of the PTO office of public affairs commented that "the U.S. intends to pursue harmonization of prior art issues within the group of developed countries, and will evaluate in the future whether an agreement may be possible in WIPO at some point." Because most of the advantages of a SPLT would be felt in developed countries, this approach seems both logical and productive.

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For background information on the terms of these treaties, see Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, The Law of International Business Transactions 44-49 (2009).
ONGOING U.S. PATENT LAW REFORM EFFORTS — INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

Congress has been considering significant changes to the 1952 Patent Act for several years. While several bills have passed one house, no one bill has gathered majority consensus in both houses. Few of the controversial provisions, however, related to international patent matters. This is not to say that the reforms proposed with respect to international issues were minor; on the contrary, they were extremely consequential.

The current U.S. patent law combines a first-to-invent standard with a statutory bar system in Section 102. Like its predecessor bills, the 2010 Patent Reform Bill now before the Senate (S.B. 515\(^\text{10}\)) would replace this system with a first-to-file system similar to that used in most other countries, except that it would have included a one-year grace period for a patent or prior publication (or otherwise publicly known) anywhere in the world directly or indirectly by the inventor(s). As this section is currently written, it follows that a foreign patent application filed by another and published less than one year before the U.S. patent application would not be anticipatory prior art under this section unless a priority dispute arises. However, given the U.S. position in its negotiations of the SPLT (above), the unilateral adoption of a first-to-file system by the U.S. Congress would tend to undermine the Executive Branch’s leverage in any SPLT negotiations.

In any case, the shift to a first-to-file system would necessitate a redefinition of the “effective filing date” for the patent application (Section 100) to mean either the filing date of a nonprovisional patent application or, if the application is for a foreign invention entitled to priority, the earliest foreign application in which the claimed invention is fully disclosed under Section 112. In addition, the current Patent Act contains special rules for priority of foreign inventions in Section 104. Priority under Section 104 depends on whether the inventor is domiciled in (or is a citizen of) a state party to the NAFTA or WTO Agreements. This section is repealed as unnecessary in light of the amendments to Section 102.

In addition, the United States is currently the only country to have a “best mode” requirement in its disclosure rules (Section 112). Previous versions of the bill would have repealed this requirement, but the 2010 bill takes a different approach. It leaves the requirement intact, but failure to fulfill the best mode requirement would no longer invalidate the patent. This amendment is expected to reduce patent litigation substantially and to vitiate the number of patents invalidated for Section 112 reasons. It would also further harmonize U.S. law with foreign practice (although not as much as previous versions of the bill). At the same time, it reduces the value to the public of a disclosure of the invention in the patent application.

Finally, previous versions of the bill would have added a post-patent grant opposition procedure as Chapter 32 to Part III of Title 35 in order to allow anyone seeking to invalidate a newly-issued patent to challenge its validity before an administrative agency rather than a court. The European Patent Office has a similar procedure. However, the 2010 bill omits this feature.

\(^{10}\) See http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf.
BLOCKED EUROPEAN PATENT COURT

Under the European Patent Convention (EPC), most European states have agreed to a procedure for granting multiple national patents through a single “European” application filed at the European Patent Office. The EU has long been working on developing a project for a single, Europe-wide patent, along the lines of the now-available Community Trade Mark. In the meantime, a recurring problem within the European system is that different national courts could interpret identical patents differently, so that, for example, infringement litigation could result in invalidity of the patent in one jurisdiction, “not invalidity” and no finding of infringement in another, and “not invalidity” and a finding of infringement in a third. In 1999, the state members of the European Patent Organization began consideration of a proposal to adopt an optional protocol to the EPC that would commit state parties to an “integrated judicial system, including uniform rules of procedure and a common appeal court” for national patents granted under the EPC procedure.

In 2007, the parties agreed upon what was thought to be a final draft “European Patent Litigation Agreement” (EPLA) that would create a European Patent Court of First Instance with jurisdiction over controversies involving state parties to the Agreement primarily relating to:

- actual or threatened infringement of an EPC patent;
- a declaratory action of non-infringement of an EPC patent; and
- actions or counterclaims for revocation or invalidity of an EPC patent.

Under Article 45(1), the national courts of the EPLA contracting states retain jurisdiction to grant provisional protective measures under applicable national law. Applicants must, however, bring an action on the merits before the European Patent Court within 31 days. The EPLA also sets up a Court of Appeal to hear all appeals from the Court of First Instance.

At present, the path to widespread adoption of EPLA is blocked by a legal conflict with the EU’s existing organizational structure. The EPLA would set up the Court as an independent entity outside of the EU framework. The court would be accessible to all EPC contracting states, some of which are not EU members, such as Switzerland. However, the European Commission wants the patent court’s statutes to closely mirror the European Union’s legal framework, and several EU members “take the view that creating a new jurisdiction in parallel to the Community jurisdiction would be complicated and risk creating inconsistencies. In the case of the creation of the Community patent it would lead to duplication of EU-wide patent courts.”11 At present, it appears that the impasse will not be broken for several more years, despite the evident advantages of an EU-wide unified patent system.

WIPO TREATY FOR IMPROVED ACCESS FOR THE BLIND

In May 2009, the World Blind Union – an NGO representing some 600 different organizations of blind and partially sighted persons from 158 countries – formally proposed a draft treaty to the WIPO’s Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights. The Treaty For Improved Access For Blind, Visually Impaired And Other Reading Disabled Persons (“Treaty for the Blind”) would limit the scope and enforcement of copyrights in order to accommodate the needs of visually impaired persons. Because the TRIPs Agreement, via Articles 8 and 12 of the Berne Convention (which are incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement), gives authors of copyrighted works exclusive rights to prepare derivative works, all authors of works protected by copyright in WTO member states have the legal right to prevent closed captioning, transcription to braille, audio recording, or other adaptations of their works for the benefit of the visually impaired. The Treaty for the Blind, if widely adopted, would address some of the impediments created by this right to the full enjoyment of copyrighted works by the visually impaired.

More specifically, the core of the draft treaty is Article 4, which creates “limitations and exceptions” to exclusive rights under copyright law for the blind or persons so visually impaired as to be unable to obtain normal access copyright protected works:

(a) It shall be permitted without the authorisation of the owner of copyright to make an accessible format of a work, supply that accessible format, or copies of that format, to a visually impaired person by any means, including by non-commercial lending or by electronic communication by wire or wireless means, and undertake any intermediate steps to achieve these objectives, when all of the following conditions are met:

1. the person or organisation wishing to undertake any activity under this provision has lawful access to that work or a copy of that work;
2. the work is converted to an accessible format, which may include any means needed to navigate information in the accessible format, but does not introduce changes other than those needed to make the work accessible to a visually impaired person;
3. copies of the work are supplied exclusively to be used by visually impaired persons; and
4. the activity is undertaken on a non-profit basis.

(b) A visually impaired person to whom a work is communicated by wire or wireless means as a result of activity under paragraph (a) shall be permitted without the authorisation of the owner of copyright to copy the work exclusively for his or her own personal use. This provision is without prejudice to any other limitations and exceptions that a person is able to enjoy.

(c) The rights under paragraph (a) shall also be available to for profit-entities and shall be extended to permit commercial rental of copies in an accessible format, if any of the following conditions are met:

1. the activity is undertaken on a for-profit basis, but only to the extent that those uses fall within the normal exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights that are permitted without remuneration to the owners of copyright;
2. the activity is undertaken by a for-profit entity on a non-profit basis, only to extend access to works to the visually impaired on an equal basis with others; or
3. the work or copy of the work that is to be made into an accessible format is not reasonably available in an identical or largely equivalent format enabling access for the visually impaired, and the entity providing this accessible format gives notice to the owner of copyright of such use and adequate remuneration to copyright owners is available.

(d) In determining if a work is reasonably available in (c)(3), the following shall be considered:
1. for developed economies, the work must be accessible and available at a similar or lower price than the price of the work available to persons who are not visually impaired; and
2. for developing countries, the work must be accessible and available at prices that are affordable, taking into account disparities of incomes for persons who are visually impaired.

Article 4(c)(3) is the only derogable provision of the treaty.

Several other provisions ensure that the Article 4 rights can be effective. Article 6 allows the circumvention of digital rights management measures for the beneficiaries of Article 4, which would either conflict with or carve out an exception to the current draft of the ACTA, discussed above. Article 7 nullifies contrary contractual provisions, which would prevent copyright owners from using a common tactic, accepted in the courts of some states, of using contracts of adhesion to deprive consumers of statutory or common law rights. Article 7 would nullify contrary provisions even in negotiated contracts. Article 8 ensures that import and export measures do not deprive the beneficiaries of Article 4 of the right to international trade in adaptations of copyrighted works for the visually impaired.

The draft treaty does try to balance the interests of the visually impaired with those of copyright owners and authors. Article 5 preserves moral rights of authors. Article 9 provides that users of adaptations under Article 4 should try to notify rights owners of the use so that they may obtain remuneration or challenge the use, facilitated by a database of copyright protected works to be kept by WIPO. Perhaps most important for copyright owners, Article 11 commits the parties to developing a method for ensuring “adequate” remuneration to copyright owners under Article 4(c)(3) in the absence of agreement between the owner and user.

The standing committee has been considering reports from stakeholders and has not given any definite indication of its intentions with respect to the draft. It is clear, however, that numerous delegations support the treaty in principle, and none has expressed outright opposition. The United States has implied concern that digital access for the visually impaired to copyright-protected materials not undermine the ability of copyright owners to prevent large scale copying through digital rights management techniques.12 The next session of the standing committee will be in June 2010, at which time the committee will continue consideration of the draft treaty.

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